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This paper discusses what kind of national innovation system (NIS) is built up in 
China and whether the NIS is helpful for China to catch up. Our research 
methodology is based on the combination of new growth theory with the NIS 
theory and our involvement in OECD research project about Chinese NIS. We 
find that Chinese NIS is composed of two complementary systems, namely FDI-
based innovation system and indigenous innovation system. Both systems are 
found to have a positive influence on attaining China’s catching-up objective but 
indigenous innovation system seems not as influential as FDI-based innovation 
system for the moment. We suggest that Chinese NIS needs to be further shaped 
for improving the absorption and innovation capability of domestic firms and for 
strengthening university-enterprise-research institute interactions.  
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In the 1990s, the research about national innovation system (NIS) focused on 
advanced countries and newly industrialized countries either individually or 
collectively. Nowadays, the NIS research is shifted to some newly emerging countries, 
like China, Brazil, India and Mexico. One of the recent research questions of NIS is 
placed to discuss whether national innovation policies can play an important role in 
helping technologically-backward countries catch up with technologically-forward 
countries. In fact, a handful existing research literature has already discussed the issue 
but not centered on one specific country like China. 
 
Freeman (1988) and Perez (1988) both stress the importance of public policies 
to identify the new techno-economic paradigm3 for catching-up. They consider that 
supporting infrastructure (e.g. science and technology policies) and the capacity for 
institutional change at both macro and micro level, impacts on the integration of a 
country into the technological revolution and the alleviation of heavy dependency on 
foreign technology. However, they do not analyze how a specific country or a group 
of sample countries can implement a set of policy instruments in response to the 
paradigm for catching-up. 
 
Radosevic (1997) focuses his research interest on the system of innovation in 
transitional countries, namely Eastern Europe. He describes the socialist system of 
                                                 
3 The expression of ‘techno-economic paradigm’ implies a process of economic selection from the 
range of the technically feasible combinations of innovations ; and indeed it takes a relatively long time 
(a decade or more) for a new paradigm to crystallize and still longer for it to diffuse right through the 
system. This diffusion involves a complex interplay between technological, economic and political 
forces. The impulse to the development of a new techno-economic paradigm arises from the perceived 
constraints on the further development of productivity, profitability and markets within the hitherto 





innovation and shows the way to restructure the system of innovation. In the same 
vein, government policies (openness, regulations) are highlighted in his research. The 
research output of Radosevic provides a theoretical remedy to transitional countries 
including China. But for adopting his proposition, it is necessary to take specific-
location, institution, social culture into consideration.  
 
Kim and Nelson (2000) analyze in detail how firms in newly industrialized 
economies acquire technological capabilities and how public policies shape the 
process of technological progress. Their study indicates that if technologically 
backward and poor countries implement proper public policies to support innovation 
activities and domestic firms creatively learn from advanced innovators, it is possible 
for the later comers to create the economic miracle as newly industrialized countries 
did in 1980s. The focus of their research is placed on domestic firms and the impact 
of foreign direct investments (FDI) on national innovation capability is much less 
discussed. 
 
Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) discuss the role of inward FDI to some 
successful catching-up economies, like Hong Kong and Singapore, and explain how 
Asian catch-up gets an access to foreign technology. They recognize the importance 
of firms in the catching-up process and identify four institutional instruments which 
need to be improved to meet the requirement of firms in developing countries. 
However, they do not explore the way how European and Asian catching-up 
economies implement these institutional instruments and examine the efficiency of 






Tylecote (2006) agrees with Fagerberg and Godinho’s opinion in terms of 
tracing technology frontier but he explains explicitly what kind of NIS catching-up 
economies need. He argues that less developed countries need twin national 
innovational system: system with upper level to engage with advanced technology 
and develop industries which use it and a lower level to help to improve the 
economy’s existing traditional technology. In order to improve the technological level 
of the whole nation, the development of intermediate technology is needed to bridge 
advanced technology and traditional technology. In other words, developing countries 
should build a middle-level of NIS to promote the diffusion of advanced technology 
resulting from the upper level toward the traditional technology resulting from the 
lower level. But he does not discuss whether the different levels of technology need to 
depend on imported technology or on indigenous innovation.  
 
In short, the existing research results signal that it is possible for 
technologically backward countries, big or small, to become competitive and affluent 
nations in knowledge-based economies if these countries can coordinate science-
industry relationships, shape appropriate institutional set-ups to support innovation 
activities and promote interactive learning. And the theoretical and practical 
experiences arising from the above research have encouraged some emerging 
countries to take actions to build up innovation-based society, like China, Brazil and 
India. 
 





has implemented a wide range of institutional reforms to promote innovation. The 
concept of Chinese national innovation system (NIS) was originally introduced by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1998 to the central government. Many studies on the 
Chinese NIS focus on either China’s S&T system reform (Fang 1999; US embassy 
2002) or S&T programs (Bao et al., 2002; Chen, 2003; Suttermier et al., 2004; Huang 
et al., 2004; Yan, 2005; Bach et al., 2007). Very few researches emphasize the 
institutional and organizational changes of the Chinese NIS, expect Liu and White. 
Liu and White (2001) study China’s NIS in a transitional context and discuss how 
organizations and distribution of fundamental activities4 change in the innovation 
process before and during the transition period. However, they do not link these 
changes to China’s catching-up objective.  
 
Based on the above fruitful research findings, we center our analysis on what 
kind of national innovation system (NIS) is built up in China and whether the NIS is 
helpful for China to catch up. In our analysis, the meaning of ‘catch-up’ adopts 
Fagerberg and Godinho’s (2005) understanding as the ability of a single country to 
narrow the gap in productivity and income vis-à-vis a leader country. To narrow the 
average income gap vis-à-vis developed countries, the new growth theory 5 
emphasizes the role of science & technology, human capital and FDI in economic 
growth (Romer, 1986, 1987; Lucas, 1988) whereas the NIS theory highlights the 
importance of innovations in catching-up economies. Our paper combines the new 
growth theory with the NIS theory to conduct our discussion. Section 2 and section 3 
                                                 
4 Fundamental activities: Liu and White (2001) identify five fundamental activities as the core of the 
NIS framework. These activities are composed of R&D, implementation, end-use, education and 
linkage.  
5 The new growth theory differs from the early post-Keynesian growth model which emphasizes 
savings and investment, and from the neoclassical models which highlight technical progress (Solow, 





will analyze the build-up of China’s NIS and its impact on attaining the nation’s 
catching-up objective respectively. Finally, we draw a conclusion and provide some 
implications for policy makers. 
 
2. FDI-based innovation system  
Although the effect of FDI on economic growth of host countries is debatable 
(Ran et al., 2007), many developing countries believe that the inward FDI is helpful 
to narrow their technological gap with developed countries, particularly witnessing 
the contribution of FDI to the rise of newly-industrialized economies. China is a 
practitioner of this view. Since the economic reform in 1978, China has implemented 
a package of institutional changes to attract FDI, expecting the spillover effects of 
FDI to facilitate technological progress of domestic firms. This section discusses how 
China takes actions to build up FDI-based innovation system and also examines the 
impact of the system on innovation promotion.  
 
2.1 Institutional changes for building up FDI-based innovation system 
 Institutional changes designed and implemented by the Chinese government 
include open policies, IPR legislation, tax holiday policy and R&D infrastructure 
reconstruction to acquire and absorb imported technology. Imported technology 
embedded in FDI is viewed as a short cut way to improve China’s competitiveness in 
the world market.  
 
- Open policy 





openness was firstly limited in four special economic zones (SEZs) as open economic 
areas in four coastal cities6. SEZs perform under a more liberal environment, isolated 
from the prevalent hierarchical system of order (Lerais et al., 2006). After receiving 
the government’s positive appraisement, various derivatives of SEZs emerge as open 
areas to FDI7, spatially distributed almost all over the country. The expansion of 
geographic openness is expected to spread FDI’s externalities at a national level rather 
than a regional level.  
 
The sectoral openness to FDI matches the “Foreign Investment Industrial 
Guidance Catalogue” in which industries foreign investors are encouraged, restricted 
and prohibited. In general, FDI are encouraged to flow in high-tech and friendly-
environment industries, such as equipment manufacturing, new material, and energy-
saving industries. Moreover, the WTO adhesion requires China to liberalize industry 
trade border. Since 2006, high value-added industries (e.g. telecommunication, 
banking and insurance) have been gradually open to foreign investors. Protected 
industries, i.e., automobiles, chemicals, and electronics, are not allowed to enjoy the 
tariff and non-tariff protection. More export-oriented products can enter domestic 
market (Jiang, 2002).  
 
- Legislation on IPRs 
Due to market diversity within or beyond the boundary of a country, 
innovators can benefit from a temporary monopoly income for a long time if their 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) are protected. Foreign firms, especially 
                                                 
6 Four coastal cities: Xiamen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Shenzhen. Xiamen is in the Fujian province, the 
other three cities are in the Guangdong province. 
7 Derivatives of SEZs: 14 open coastal cities (1984), 54 economic & technical development zones 
(1984), 53 high technology development zones (also called S&T industrial parks, 1988). Details see 





multinational companies (MNCs), are recognized as a major source of technology and 
know-how channelling to developing countries. To sustain their profitability, foreign 
companies require the host country to build up and implement a legal system on IPRs 
protection. Countries without IPR policy would decrease the gains to an innovator. 
Sooner or later, competitors will be able to imitation, or invent around, or develop a 
better version of, the initial innovation (Nelson, 1987). Indeed, the destination of FDI 
is influenced by the legal framework and the rule of law in the recipient country 
(Report, 2003).  
 
To attract FDI and also to motivate domestic innovators, China has made great 
progress in developing a comprehensive legal system on IPRs. Laws on IPRs range 
from Patent Law to Trademark Law, Copyright Law, Regulations for the Protection of 
Computer Software and so on. Although the protection of IPRs is criticized as not 
being effective, it signals that the infringement activities of IPRs are to be punished 
under the established legislative framework.  
 
- Tax holiday policy 
 Since the 1980s, FDI have begun to enjoy excess national treatment in terms 
of tax. The central government outlines the tax polices and local governments to a 
certain extent are given autonomy to formulate their preferential treatment towards 
foreign investors. Governments at local levels center more on economic growth and 
revenue increase in their jurisdictions when attracting FDI, whilst the central 
government pays much attention to transferring technology and managerial skills 





priority to foreign R&D centers so as to encourage foreign innovation in China. 
Although new enterprise income tax law of 2008 reunifies the differential tax rate 
between foreign enterprises and domestic enterprises, high-tech and energy-saving 
foreign firms can still benefit from preferential tax rate, namely 15% against the basic 
tax rate of 25% for general enterprises. The purpose of tax policies toward FDI has 
moved from exportation orientation to innovation.  
 
- Building of Research & Development (R&D) Infrastructure 
To help domestic firms absorb foreign technology, the government set up over 
400 research institutes (RIs) in the early stage of industrialization (Liu and White, 
2001). In the 1980s, the science & technology reform restructured RIs to promote the 
efficiency of R&D infrastructure. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC) and the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering (CAE) are very important components of the current Chinese R&D 
infrastructure.  
 
Founded in 1949, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is China’s 
foremost natural science and technology research institute, administrating some 100 
research institutes. CAS keeps close contact with international S&T communities to 
trace the world frontier knowledge and technology under various forms: sending 
Chinese researchers abroad; organizing international academic conferences; joining 
R&D alliance with foreign multinational companies… In 2005, CAS established 6 







The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC) was established 
in 1986 to promote and finance basic research. It develops cooperation and exchanges 
with foreign scientific organizations and runs a Sino-German Center for Research 
Promotion. However, NNSFC does not directly support R&D activities of firms but 
provides grants to brilliant researchers in universities and research institutes.  
 
The Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) was set up in 1994. It functions 
as an advisory institution in matters related to engineering and also supports technical 
research projects financially. It does not own research institutes but carries out 
research through engineering departments at universities.  
 
These three government-based research institutes are open to international 
science & technology communities. The wide-ranging network with foreign partners 
facilitates the inflow of technological information. The mobility of researchers at 
home and abroad also contributes to the circulation of knowledge. CAS has employed 
52 foreign academicians and CAE 35 ones8. Hence, these public R&D institutes are 
directly or indirectly helpful to Chinese firms for acquiring, identifying, assimilating 
and adapting imported technology.  
 
2.2 Attained objective? 
After three decades, has FDI-based innovation system promoted China’s 
innovation? To assess the efficiency of FDI-based innovation system, we here use the 
quantity of inward FDI and the types of inward technology to measure the acquired 
                                                 
8  The data collected from CAS and CAE’s website respectively. The data of CAS represents the 






foreign technology, and use the number of foreign patents, foreign R&D centers and 
high-tech trade balance to measure the contribution of FDI to innovation.  
 
1) Acquired foreign technology 
Given that the impact of the Chinese IPR legislation on the inflows of FDI is 
not conclusive, China’s open policy is widely accepted to have played a positive 
effect on the growth of FDI in China. Deng Xiaoping’s discourse during his south 
tour in 1992 and China’s access to WTO in 2001, both events stimulated new foreign 
entrants and foreign incumbents to invest or reinvest in China. In 1999, China was the 
third biggest recipient country of FDI in the world, behind UK and the USA. It hosted 
over a third of the foreign affiliates of multinational corporations (Dahlman and 
Aubert, 2001). Following China’s adhesion to WTO, the inward FDI increased very 
fast. China overtook the United States in 2002 and became the world largest recipient 
of FDI (Bajpai and Dasgupta, 2004). Starting from 2006, high value-added sectors 
(e.g. banking, insurance) have been gradually open to foreign investors. More FDI is 
predicted to flow into China in the years to come. 
 
The inward FDI can be divided into three categories: investments from 
Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan affiliated enterprises, from newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs) affiliated enterprises (e.g. South Korea, Malaysia), and from 
advanced country affiliated enterprises. The former two categories normally transfer 
mature & standardized technology and general purpose equipment, and the third 
category, especially western multinational companies, mainly transfer product 






2001). Many imported technologies are embedded in equipments and facilities. The 
performance of imported capital goods improves productivity, and reduces production 
cost and materials consumption. Moreover, imported technology rarely takes the form 
of licensing agreements which is supposed to be more efficient for technology 
diffusion than physical goods import. Licensed technology import represents 
comparatively limited spending: less than 0.5% of merchandise imports in China’s 
case, against 0.7% for India, 2.2% for South Korea and 3.2% for Japan (Dahlman and 
Aubert, 2001).  
 
In general, many  inward FDI in the 1990s concentrated in manufacturing, 
mining and construction industries (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001; Tseng and Zebregs, 
2002; Greeven, 2004; Chen, 2005). In recent years, inflow FDI ranges from 
manufacturing to real estates, leasing and business service, whole sale and retaining 
business9.  
 
2) Innovation promotion  
FDI is a potentially powerful channel for integrating a system of innovation 
into global networks and influencing its structural change. The effect of FDI on a host 
country is still arguable, good or bad. The host country may increase its dynamic 
capability but also takes risk of ‘vicious circles’ of deterioration where a country or a 
sector has its initial comparative advantages (Radosevic, 1997). A large literature on 
inward FDI in China shows that FDI plays a positive impact on the productivity of 
Chinese industry and on upgrading Chinese export segments (Zhang and Song, 2000; 
Shi, 2001; Lemoine and Kesenci, 2004; Li et al., 2007; Luo, 2007; Ran et al., 2007; 
                                                 







Yao and Wei, 2007). Some scholars find that FDI decreases the R&D expenditure of 
its Chinese partners (Fan and Hu, 2007) and it may cause economic inequality (Ran et 
al., 2007). However, they do not measure whether FDI contribute to China’s 
innovation. We now discuss this point through three dimensions: foreign patents, 
foreign R&D centers and high-tech trade balance. 
 
- Foreign patents in China 
Although the total number of foreign patents is smaller than domestic patents 
in the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China, foreign patenters hold an 
overwhelming position in invention patent grants, accounting for 60% of total during 
the period of 1985-2008. The foreign patented technology in China clusters in 
telecommunication, electronic equipment, electronic engineering, electronic power 
and information technology, which is in line with domestic patented technology. The 
constant increase of foreign patentability leads to a patenting competition between 
foreign patenters and domestic patenters. Actually, the gap between foreign and 
domestic invention patent grants has been gradually decreased. Japan, USA, South 
Korean and German are the four leading foreign patenters in China. However, their 
patented technology mostly comes from their mother company’s technology and is 
modified or transformed to adapt to local market. Original and basic R&D activities 
are comparatively low.  
 
- Foreign R&D centers 
Since the late of 1990s, the Chinese governments have implemented a series of 






by China’s abundant human capital and tax holiday policy, a lot of multinational 
companies set up China-based R&D centers and integrate these centers into their 
global R&D system. Up to now, over 1100 foreign R&D centers have been settled in 
China, particularly in coastal regions. Some foreign R&D centers belong to an 
independent legal person, others are embedded in foreign companies. In spite of little 
original innovation and basic research in these foreign R&D centers, their presence 
has increased the innovation activities in China. They are developing close linkage 
with some elite universities, to tap local talent and conduct cooperative research 
projects. 
 
- High-tech trade balance 
In recent years, China’s high-tech exports and imports have largely increased. 
The high-tech exports grew from 13.3% of all merchandise exports in 1992 to 30% in 
2005. The progress of high-tech trade is directly associated with China’s integration 
in the international segmentation of the production process. Export-oriented foreign 
firms played a very important role in helping China integrate the global production 
chain. Actually, foreign firms dominate high-tech trade in electronic and telecom 
equipment and in computers and office equipment. In 2005, 88% of China’s high-tech 
exports were produced by foreign owned firms (Jakobson, 2007: p.2).  
 
In short, FDI-based innovation system has succeeded in attracting FDI. 
Technology embedded in FDI has improved productivity, upgraded export product 
structure and economic growth. China has become the world’s second biggest holder 






economy in the world. The growth of foreign patents and more presence of foreign 
R&D centers promote innovation activities in China. These facts indicate that FDI-
based innovation system performs efficiently.  
 
However, the heavy dependence on foreign technology rather than in-house 
R&D activities pushes domestic firms away from acquiring key upstream 
technologies. Without core technological know-how, domestic firms cannot become 
competitive players in those industries which are traditionally dominated by advanced 
countries. The rising of Japan in the 1960s-1970s and the South Korea in the 1970s-
1980s has proved the importance of indigenous innovation. Moreover, the nowadays 
economic and political environment is quite different from the past settings. Imitation 
becomes more and more expensive and the protection of IPRs is much stronger than 
before. Learning from the historic stories and current world settings, the Chinese 
government has never given up the building-up of indigenous innovation system for 
catching up. A set of supporting infrastructure have been constructed to conduct 
indigenous innovation.  
 
3. Indigenous innovation system 
A numerous literature explains the importance of indigenous innovation for 
catching-up countries (Freeman, 1988; Perez, 1988; Kim, 1993; Fagerberg and 
Godinho, 2005; Gu and Lundvall, 2006). Some scholars emphasize indigenous 
technological innovation (Perez, 1988; Nelson, 2000), others focus on organizational 
and institutional innovation (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005). We here place 







3.1 Supporting Infrastructure for knowledge generation 
Universities and public research institutes are principal knowledge generators. 
To encourage them to generate more knowledge, the Chinese government has 
launched various national S&T programs, reformed university and public research 
institutes, and carried out high-quality talent training and recruitment program since 
1985. This section 3.1 focuses on these four points to analyze China’s knowledge 
generation infrastructure.  
 
3.1.1 Major national S&T programs  
Innovation sometimes results from cumulative knowledge, and sometimes 
needs to take enormous R&D investments which may result in radical breaks from the 
past (Lundvall, 1992). China’s national S&T programs aim to enhance China’s 
technological competence through searching and exploring 10  activities. These 
activities increase the stock of knowledge and provide sources to radical technological 
innovation.  
 
China’s National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC in 1986) and 
Key Basic Science R&D Program (“973” Program in 1997), emphasize the build-up 
of a genuinely original innovation capability in basic research. Universities and 
research institutes are the main actors to carry out the NNSFC and “973” Program. 
The Key State Laboratories Program (1984) supports the set-up of 182 established 
laboratories (2005 data), which aim to promote research and advanced training. These 
laboratories cover both basic and applied research fields, such as life science, 
                                                 
10 Searching and exploring: the most important difference between exploring and searching is that 
‘exploring’ is less goal-oriented than profit-oriented search. Exploring will sometimes result in breaks 






engineering, information, chemistry, geoscience, mathematics and physics. By 2005, 
these laboratories together with 6 state laboratories (in the course of establishment) 
undertook 12965 research projects among which 22.9% were conducted jointly with 
industry (Key State Laboratories Report 2005).  
 
Additionally, another three S&T programs center on technology advancement. 
The Key Technology R&D Program (1983) concentrates resources on key and 
common technologies linked to industrial need and social sustainable development. 
For example, the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) gives top priority to technology 
connected to energy-water-saving and environmental friendliness. The High 
Technology R&D Program (“863” program in 1986) identifies the emerging new-tech 
paradigm and carries out high-tech research so as to help China integrate into the new 
paradigm. The National New Product Program (1988) supports mainly high-
technology-based firms.  
 
The funding mechanism of S&T programs is distributed on the basis of 
projects competition replacing the former planned allocation. The carriers of such 
projects have autonomy to organize their research teams and manage the funding 
obtained (Huang et al., 2004; Xue, 2006). The government supervises the process of 
these projects, and assigns specialized institutions to evaluate the research results 
arising from the publicly funded projects when they are accomplished. The 
management of S&T programs pushes executors of S&T programs to take the quality 
of research into consideration seriously. At the same time, executors have incentives 






financed S&T projects.  
 
3.1.2 University 
The government decreases the budget for universities but compensates it by 
granting them more autonomy. The aim of cutting-down government grants is to force 
universities to generate and commercialize more industry-needed knowledge. On the 
one hand, universities set up new specialties and tap outstanding talents, especially 
overseas Chinese scholars to meet the requirement of increased student enrollments. 
At the same time, universities provide more and more option courses for students. 
Teaching staffs are pushed to widen their knowledge boundaries to meet the changing 
education system. Some teaching staffs reenter universities to refresh their knowledge, 
others learn by themselves. On the other hand, universities have strengthened linkage 
with industry. Industry has become the second financial supporter for academic 
research. In some prestigious research universities, like Tsinghua University, industry 
goes ahead of the government and acts as the biggest research financier. 
 
And university reward system has been reformed to value the contribution of 
professors to teaching, research and knowledge capitalization. The workload 
arrangement of professors is more flexible. Professors can take less teaching workload 
and engage in more research. The incentive measures motivate professors to generate 









3.1.3 Public research institutes (PRIs) 
The reform of PRIs is another measure that the Chinese government embraced 
in an effort to enhance knowledge production. PRIs were inactive knowledge 
generators under planned economy. The State Planning Commission designed 
research projects and allocated related resources to research institutes. The State 
Science and Technology Commission (replaced by the Ministry of Technology and 
Science since 1998) managed S&T activities in these institutes. The rigid funding and 
R&D management hindered researchers’ active participation in innovation.  
 
After 1985, the R&D funding system was reformed to a project-based 
competition one. PRIs were forced to be competitive so as to obtain more government 
grants. As they gained more autonomy in terms of personnel, finance, property 
management and international cooperation, research institutes introduced the 
remuneration differentiation policy which motivated research staff and encouraged 
the mobility of human resources. Besides, these institutes especially those doing 
experiment and development were pushed to merge into enterprises. The government 
concentrated its funding on the unchanged institutes that primarily conduct basic 
research (Huang et al., 2004). By 2001, over 300 research institutes were merged into 
enterprises, over 600 ones changed to become profitable firms and a few were 
integrated into universities (Gu and Lundvall, 2006). The reform forces PRIs, who 









3.1.4 Human resources  
Human resources build undoubtedly the fundamental of an innovative society 
(Jakobson, 2007). Targeting to become an innovation leading country in the world, 
the Chinese government has actively taken measures since the 1990s to mobilize 
researchers with potential competence and attract overseas Chinese who obtained 
higher education degrees and career experiences abroad. For example, NNSFC has 
created several funds to send selected young scholars abroad for training and also 
attract overseas Chinese scholars to return to work in China. Similarly, CAS has 
launched “Hundred Talents Program” to recruit promising scientists. Between 1998 
and 2004, the program of CAS succeeded in bringing back 778 foreign-based Chinese 
researchers (Jakobson, 2007).  
 
During the period of 2000-2005, the total number of returned overseas 
Chinese attained over 119, 00011. Many universities and research institutes provide an 
attractive package of welfare to these returnees, in terms of remuneration, job 
assignment, housing, school entrance for their children and in some cases a bulk of 
funds to initiate research programs. They are expected to help China identify the 
world new tech-economic paradigm and push Chinese technological progress to 
approach or reach the world forefront.  
 
3.2 Supporting infrastructure for knowledge commercialization and diffusion 
In line with knowledge generation infrastructure, the government set up 
technology markets, Torch Program, productivity promotion centers and national 
technology transfer centers to commercialize and diffuse knowledge. Technology 
                                                 






markets and Torch Program were launched in 1988 to facilitate academy-industry 
technology transfer. Productivity promotion centers, established in 1992, were 
partially the results of the transformation of public research institutes. They specialize 
in consulting services for technology-based SMEs. National technology transfer 
centers were founded in 2001 to commercialize university research outputs. The four 
components are explained below in detail. 
 
3.2.1 Technology markets 
Technology markets play an important role in capitalization and diffusion of 
knowledge. It makes R&D outputs tradable at market prices. The marketable 
technology is traded in four categories of contracts on the market: technology 
development, technology transfer, technology consultation and technology service. 
Enterprises, research institutes and universities are the main players in technology 
markets.  
 
Technology development contracts dominate transactions on technology 
markets in terms of contract value. They are usually traded between university and 
industry. Enterprises entrust universities with technology tasks, or combine with 
universities to do some research for a specific topic, or even to set up an entity with 
universities for long-term research in a special field (Xue, 2006). Technology transfer 
contract is associated with patent licensing. Both industry and academy have 
expanded patenting activities in recent years, but patent licensing-based technology 
transfer in China is not as efficient as in developed countries because of the 






Technology consultation and service contracts are probably much more flexible ways 
of transferring knowledge and technology. Such contracts often contain technology 
information supply, talent training and equipment maintenance. Technology service is 
the most frequent contract traded in the market.  
 
Technology markets facilitate the circulation of technological information and 
guide universities and research institutes to generate market-oriented knowledge. 
Enterprises can use purchased technology from the market to replace in-house R&D 
activities in case of their weak R&D capability, whereas those technology generators 
can gain revenues through the commercialization of research outputs in the market.  
 
3.2.2 Torch Program  
The Torch Program (1988) is a key component of knowledge 
commercialization and diffusion infrastructure, devoted to the promotion of 
indigenous innovation through nurturing new technology-based firms. Three 
institutions were created to carry out the program: Science and Technology Industrial 
Parks (STIPs), Technology Business Incubators (TBIs) and Innovation Fund for 
Technology-based Small-Medium Enterprises (Innofund).  
 
Nowadays, 53 national STIPs have been spatially distributed almost 
throughout China. However, its increasing production of export oriented high-tech 
manufactures and heavy reliance on foreign investment set China’s STIPs apart from 
upgrading indigenous innovation capabilities. The majority of companies in STIPs are 






A small number of foreign and joint ventures have a strong presence in production 
and exportation. The gap arises from a lack of competitive high-technology of 
Chinese companies. The failure of high-tech industrialization in STIPs may be 
compensated by the performance of technology business incubators (TBIs).  
 
TBIs create a favourable environment for nurturing new technology-based 
firms to commercially exploit R&D achievements arising from universities, research 
institutes and enterprises. University incubators are typical ones to foster domestic 
technology-based firms. Entrepreneurial professors and students bring their R&D 
results from laboratories and create new innovative firms in university incubators. 
These technologies may not necessarily be at the world frontier but as least they are 
new to them or to China. In case of successful performance, these start-ups generate a 
demonstration effect on other professors and students. More university research 
outputs would go out of laboratories and be transferred into new products and services. 
Incubators for overseas scholars and international business incubators tend to foster 
foreign technology-based firms. These incubators are usually embedded to STIPs so 
that incubation and high-tech industrialization can be linked together in a same park. 
Incubated firms bring new foreign technology into China and possibly generate a 
demonstration spillover effects on other firms.  
 
Market failure problems from technology markets, e.g. information asymmetry 
about the technology, difficult estimation of the value of tradable technology, 
potential moral hazards of contract executors, can be to some degree overcomed by 







Innofund represents the main governmental financial support for technology-
based SMEs to market innovation. It can accompany SMEs from the incubation stage 
to the production stage. Innofund is also used as a leverage to attract other 
investments for the development of SMEs. It helps SMEs solve the problem of market 
failure linked to difficult financial access. The selection criteria of Innofund 
emphasize innovativeness, R&D resources and Chinese ownership of SMEs. It 
indicates that Innofund prioritizes indigenous technological innovation of SMEs. 
Indeed, technology-based SMEs have become a very important innovation force in 
the Chinese NIS.  
 
3.2.3 Productivity Promotion Centers (PPCs) 
Productivity promotion centers are deemed to be a bridge between universities, 
firms and research institutes. They are composed of a group of intermediary and 
consulting organizations, established since 1992 throughout the country to support 
small-medium innovation-based firms. The Ministry of Science and Technology 
together with local S&T Commissions manage these centers in terms of macro-
policies and business guidance. PPCs provide consulting services in terms of 
management, technology, the applications of S&T projects and technology-based 
services. They take advantages of their wide networks with academy and introduce 
experts in responsive to the demands of small medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
PPCs are a complementary institutional innovation for technology business incubators 
and technology markets to capitalize and diffuse knowledge. They promote the 







3.2.4 National Technology Transfer Centers (NTTCs) 
The co-existence of technology markets (TM), Torch Program and 
productivity production centers does not necessarily mean there are institutional 
interactions among them. The emergence of national technology transfer centers 
(NTTCs) in 2001 fille up the connection gap and specialize in managing univeristy 
IPR issues and the commercialization of academic research outputs. NTTCs establish 
connections with TM, TBIs, Innofunds, STIPs and PPCs. The connections keep the 
related institutions informed about research outputs so as to facilitate the 
marketability and diffusion of academic achievements. Indeed, NTTCs act as 
intermediaries between university, industry and market.  
 
3.3 Indigenous innovation improved? 
Over two decades has passed. How about China’s indigenous innovation now? 
We address the question in terms of published academic papers, patentability and new 
products. Publications are used as an indicator of knowledge generation, whereas 
patents and new products are indictors to measure knowledge capitalization.  
 
1) Scientific publications 
In recent years, more and more Chinese authors’ names appear in international 
academic journals. Chinese academic papers demonstrated an exponential increase. 
The number of Chinese scientific publications collected by SCI (Science Citation 
Index), ISTP (Index of S&T Proceedings) and EI (Engineering Index) reached 153374 






(7.2%) and Japan (7.1%)12. About 30% of these publications resulted from China’s 
major national S&T programs13. Elite research institutes and universities were major 
publishers, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 
University and so on. China has become the fourth leading nation in terms of its share 
of the world’s scientific publications. 
 
Along with the exponential increase of scientific publications, the citation 
rates of Chinese publications are increasing exponentially as well (Zhou and 
Leydesdorff, 2006). Six disciplinary publications were placed in the world top 10 in 
terms of the citation rate of papers during the period of 1996-2005, namely material 
science, chemistry, mathematics, synthesis, engineering technology and physics. 
According to the SCI database, China ranked world 13th in terms of citation rate 
between 1996 and 2005 which was advanced as compared to world 19th between 1992 
and 200114. The growth of publications and of citation rate indicates that supporting 
infrastructure is efficient to facilitate the creation of new knowledge. 
 
2) Patentability 
In terms of patentability, domestic patenters have increasingly expanded their 
patenting activities in the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China. The 
annual average growth of filed patent applications attained over 20% between 2000 
and 2007. The numbers of filed patent applications and grants in 2007, namely 
586,734 pieces and 301,632 pieces, were over 4 and 3 times respectively as compared 
to the corresponding patentability in 2000. Firms hold the first place in patentability. 
                                                 
12 See China S&T Statistics Year Report 2006. http://www.sts.org.cn/zlhb/2007/3.1.htm#4 
13 According to National Statistics Bureau of China, NNSFC published 13610 academic papers in 
overseas journals, 8218 for “973 Programs”, 1637 for Key Technology R&D Program and 9830 for 
“863 Program” in 2004. 






During the period 2001-2006, the growth of on-duty invention applications filed by 
domestic enterprises amounted to 43.2%. In 2006, they acquired 51.3% of all 
invention patents granted to domestic patenters (MOST, 2007). Some technology-
based Chinese firms, like Huawei and Zhongxing15, are leading invention patenters 
but the majority of Chinese enterprises have few patenting activities. Universities are 
the second biggest domestic patentees, behind firms but ahead of research institutes. 
Their R&D expenditure accounted for nearly 10% of the total but they acquired over 
30% of all invention patents granted by SIPO in 2005 16 . Nevertheless, foreign 
patentees still dominate invention patent grants and domestic patenters take an 
overwhelming advantage in utility model and design patenting. The less-R&D-
intensive patentability may have meaning in the marketplace, but they do not 
represent significant innovations (Liu and White, 2001).  
 
With respect to overseas patentability, China displays a remarkable growth 
although its world position is moderate. Its patent applications to the European Patent 
Office (EPO) increased from 743 units in 2003 to 1403 units in 2005 at the aggregate 
level. About 27% of these applications were foreign co-invested. The granted patents 
in triadic patent families17 to China attained 433 units in 2005 compared to 177 units 
in 2003, which lagged far behind 16368 USA, 15239 Japan and 6266 Germany. China 
occupies rank 1 place among all non-OECD countries but only rank 12 among 39 
sampled countries by OECD (OECD, 2007).  
                                                 
15 In 2006, three domestic enterprises were in the top 10 firms in terms of invention patents applications 
filed in China and the rest were foreign invested firms.  Huawei and Zhongxing, two domestic 
telecommunication equipment manufacturers, took the first and the second top places respectively 
(MOST, 2007).   
16 The percentage was calculated by the author on the basis of the data which were collected from 
China S&T Statistics Data Book 2006. 
17 Patents applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and granted 
to the US Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), estimations for priority year 2005. The priority date 







The slow increase of invention patents mismatches the fast growing scientific 
publications. The patentability ranking of China is much lower than its scientific 
publications ranking. It shows that Chinese enterprises have a weak absorptive 
capability from open science on the one hand, and on the other hand universities and 
research institutes may not generate much market-oriented knowledge to meet 
industrial needs.  
 
3) New products 
Since large medium-sized enterprises (LMEs) are the major domestic patenters, 
we use LME’s new products to assess the innovation capability of Chinese firms. 
New products reflect the capabilities of LMEs in transforming new knowledge into 
visible new goods. In contrast with the rising patentability of firms, new products do 
not follow the increasing trend (see Figure 1). The value of total new products as to 
the value of total industrial products attained the peak of 17.5% in 2002 but soon 
dropped to 15.5% in 2005. The ratio of new product sales to total sales was even 
lower, standing only at 14.61% in 2005. One reason may be a result of LMEs’ 
insufficient capability to transform their rising patents into commodities, while the 
other reason may be linked to LMEs’ less knowledge-intensive patents which add 










Figure 1: The evolution of LME’s new products in terms of value and sales income 
 





This paper discusses what kind of national innovation system (NIS) is built up 
in China and whether the NIS is helpful for China to catch up. We find that Chinese 
NIS is composed of two complementary systems, namely FDI-based innovation 
system and indigenous innovation system. Both systems are found to have a positive 
influence on attaining China’s catching-up objective but indigenous innovation 
system seems not as influential as FDI-based innovation system for the moment. A 
large bulk of FDI has flowed into China and the acquired foreign technology presents 
varieties. The growth of foreign patents and the coming of more foreign R&D centers 
in China promote the total growth of patentability. FDI has upgraded China’s export 






foreign technology pushes domestic firms away from acquiring key upstream 
technologies. Without core technological know-how, domestic firms cannot become 
competitive players in those industries which are traditionally dominated by advanced 
countries. 
 
Indigenous innovation system has helped China make great progress in world 
scientific publications and patentability but the presentation of new products grows 
very slowly to the market. All these facts indicate that indigenous innovation system 
facilitates knowledge generation but is not conclusively influential to promote 
knowledge commercialization and diffusion. This is related to the weak capability of 
domestic firms to absorb research outputs arising from open science on the one hand, 
and on the other hand it is linked to the mismatching of knowledge output with the 
market need. A further reform of the Chinese NIS is needed to strengthen the 
absorption and innovation capability of domestic firms and to strengthen university-
enterprise-research institute interactions.  
 
Our future study will be placed on whether foreign patentability has a spillover 
effect on domestic patentability and how recent national policies (e.g. China’s 
national medium and long-term S&T development plan (2006-2020), government 
procurement regulations and national IPR strategic outlines) impact on the innovation 
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